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Abstract
Gradual processes of democratization and autocratization have gained increased attention in the
literature. Assessing such processes in a comparative framework remains a challenge, however,
due to their under-conceptualization and a bifurcation of the democracy and autocracy literatures.
This article provides a new conceptualization of regime transformation as substantial and sustained
changes in democratic institutions and practices in either direction. This allows for studies to address
both democratization and autocratization as related obverse processes. Using this framework, the
article introduces a dataset that captures 680 unique episodes of regime transformation (ERT)
from 1900 to 2019. These data provide novel insights into regime change over the past 120 years,
illustrating the value of developing a unified framework for studying regime transformation. Such
transformations, while meaningfully altering the qualities of the regime, only produce a regime
transition about 32% of the time. The majority of episodes either end before a transition takes
place or do not have the potential for such a transition (i.e. constituted further democratization
in democratic regimes or further autocratization in autocratic regimes). The article also provides
comparisons to existing datasets and illustrative case studies for face validity. It concludes with a
discussion about how the ERT framework can be applied in peace research.
Introduction
What explains the rise and fall of political regimes? Why do some dictators resist pressures to
liberalize, whereas others respond to these pressures with only minimal reforms and still others
transition to democracy? Why do some democracies exhibit resilience, whereas others experience
backsliding or even breakdown? These and similar questions about political regime change constitute
one of the most intensely researched areas in political science, to which quantitative analyses have
made valuable and increasingly sophisticated contributions. Yet, the two dominant approaches to
addressing these questions require improbable assumptions and use debatable units of analysis. They
also pursue research under separate frameworks concerning democratic breakdown versus democratic
transition, which hinders a joint and coherent study of regime change. This article contributes an
innovative conceptual framework and dataset – the Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) –
available for the study of regimes to overcome these limitations.
The ERT framework conceptualizes processes of regime change in either direction along the
democratic-autocratic continuum as episodes of regime transformation. This provides new oppor-
tunities to study democratization and autocratization within a unified research agenda. It allows
for research on four broad types of regime transformation, including liberalization in autocracies,
democratic deepening in democracies, and regression in both democracies and autocracies. We
also distinguish between ten possible outcomes for those episodes that matter for contemporane-
ous research, including standard depictions of regime change (i.e. transition to- and breakdown
of democracy). Our operationalization of this framework – ERT dataset – includes start and end
dates, as well as the type and outcome of 680 episodes observed within the Varieties of Democracy
(V-Dem) dataset from 1900–2019 (Coppedge et al., 2020a). Thus, the ERT enables scholars to
analyze processes, mechanisms, and outcomes within defined periods of regime transformation in
comparison to each other, as well as to years without regime transformation.
The ERT provides three main advantages over existing approaches to studying regime change.
First, it avoids problematic assumptions of unit homogeneity, symmetric and constant effects. Sec-
ond, it integrates key insights from the qualitative comparative literature by treating regime change
as a prolonged, gradual, and highly uncertain process of regime transformation. Finally, the ERT
allows scholars to study democratization and autocratization within the same systematic framework.
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For quantitative researchers, the ERT provides opportunities to model the causes and consequences
of democratization and autocratization simultaneously. For qualitative researchers, the ERT pro-
vides key insights for single and comparative case selection.
While approached with academic goals in mind, the questions about regime transformation
raised here are also highly relevant to the policy- and practitioner community. Democracy is associ-
ated with international peace (Altman et al., 2020; Hegre, 2014; Hegre et al., 2020), human security
(IDEA, 2006), economic development (Acemoglu et al., 2019; Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu, 2008),
and environmental protection (Farzin and Bond, 2006; Winslow, 2005). Generally speaking, demo-
cratic institutions promote investments in human development (Gerring et al., 2012) that benefit
ordinary citizens through improved education (Ansell and Lindvall, 2013; Stasavage, 2005), health
(Wigley et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2019), and gender equality (Sundström et al., 2017; Zagrebina,
2020). Better understanding under what conditions democracy emerges, declines, and dies is therefor
not merely an academic exercise; it has important normative implications from a policy perspective.
This article first discusses the two dominant approaches to analyzing regime change, highlighting
several drawbacks of the current state of the art. We then suggest a unifying framework of regime
transformation and explain the logic behind operationalizing episodes of regime transformation
using data from V-Dem. We introduce the ERT dataset, describing the sample of episodes and the
frequency of outcomes, and compare them to other frequently used datasets. After two illustrative
case studies, we discuss applications in conflict research. We conclude by outlining the advantages
of the ERT for future research on democratization and autocratization as both effects and causes.
A bifurcated literature on regime change
The state of the art in the study of regime change can be roughly classified into transitologist
and incrementalist ontological perspectives. While often treated as incongruent (e.g. Jackman and
Bollen, 1989), the two perspectives are complementary in their assumptions and unified in their
overarching object of inquiry, which we refer to as regime transformation. Yet, three fundamental
disadvantages emerge from this divided field that undermine efforts at knowledge accumulation
and practical relevance. To overcome these limitations, we develop a novel framework of regime
transformation that can help unify the literature.
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Table I provides an overview of the two dominant approaches to the study of regime change,
including the ontological assumptions, guiding questions, dominant data sources, and limitations.
The first approach – here referred to as transitologist1 – focuses on democratic transitions or break-
downs as discrete events. For example, classic case-based works on democratic transitions focus
on founding elections as moments of discrete regime change (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Dia-
mond et al., 1989; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). While the comparative case-study literature
typically details complex processes and multiple pathways to uncertain outcomes, the object is
usually to explain the transition moment. Meanwhile, quantitative works in this genre, like those
found in debates over modernization theory, often employ a dichotomous measure of democracy,
regressing discrete changes in regime classification on explanatory factors of interest (e.g. Boix and
Stokes, 2003; Epstein et al., 2006; Przeworski et al., 2000; Brownlee, 2009; Haggard and Kaufman,
2012; Miller, 2015). The binary classification of the dependent variable necessarily means that the
transition moment is treated in isolation from the longer processes often discussed in case studies.
Regardless of methodology, however, works employing the transitologist approach share two core
ontological assumptions: (1) that regimes can be dichotomized into democracies and autocracies
and (2) that there is a distinct, observable moment of transition between democracy and autocracy.
Table I. Two dominant approaches to the study of regime change
Transitologist Incrementalist
Ontological assumptions Democracy & autocracy as dichotomy,observable transition moment
Democracy-autocracy continuum,
incremental changes in either direction
are meaningful equivalents
Guiding questions What explains democratic transition,survival, and breakdown?
What explains changes in
levels of democracy?
Data sources, key studies
Alvarez et al. (1996);
Boix et al. (2013);
Cheibub et al. (2010)
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006);
Jackman and Bollen (1989);
Teorell (2010)
Limitations
Assumptions of unit homogeneity,
omits unsuccessful attempts,





short-run changes as discrete events,
democratization/autocratization
as empirical equivalents
1We borrow the terminology from the case-based “transitology” literature (e.g. O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986;
Diamond et al., 1989) since we find their ontological assumptions to be similar to those of the discussed quantitative
works.
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The second approach – which we call incrementalist2 – explores incremental (usually annual)
changes in levels of democracy (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Coppedge and Reinicke, 1990;
Jackman and Bollen, 1989; Teorell, 2010; Levitz and Pop-Eleches, 2010). These studies are almost
invariably quantitative, although they might be paired with qualitative case studies. For example,
Teorell (2010) provides an empirical overview of the determinants of democratization based on
annual changes, as well as annual upturns and downturns. Meanwhile, studies like Beal and Graham
(2014) investigate democratization using a mixed-methods research design. These studies avoid
ontological assumptions about the dichotomous nature of regimes or transitions as events (Jackman
and Bollen, 1989); instead, they rely on two entirely different ontological assumptions: (1) that
democracy and autocracy lie at opposite ends of a continuum and (2) that incremental changes in
one direction or another are meaningful equivalents.
Three core limitations
The bifurcation in the literature on regime change impedes efforts at knowledge accumulation and
risks making the field appear disjointed for those seeking out practical implications from academic
research. Bridging this divide requires attention to three limitations. First, the transitologist
approach treats all observations within the same regime class as equivalent, i.e. assumes unit
homogeneity, even though cases and their underlying processes often differ. For example, assuming
that all autocracies have an equal likelihood of transitioning to democracy, ceteris paribus, ignores
the great deal of heterogeneity among autocracies. Critically, it fails to account for those cases
where processes of democratization (or autocratization) occur but a transition was never observed.
This treats a highly stable case like North Korea as the equivalent to Argentina in 1930–1960 when
three episodes of liberalization failed to usher in democracy. Ignoring heterogeneity among the
null units in the sample means overlooking “potentially relevant and theoretically revealing cases”
(Ziblatt, 2006: p.24).3 The incrementalist approach overcomes the assumption of unit homogeneity
by measuring changes in levels of democracy, and sometimes controlling for lagged levels; yet, this
2We use the term “incrementalist” because these studies tend to operationalize regime change in increments,
i.e. changes between two relatively close points in time. These studies are sometimes described using the term
“gradualist” (Carothers, 2007). Yet this implies attention to longer-term regime change processes – such as those
delineated in case-based research and the ERT dataset - which cannot adequately be addressed through incremental
operationalization.
3This well-known problem is often referred to as Simpson’s Paradox (Wagner, 1982).
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introduces an equally vexing assumption of symmetric and constant effects or that the same unit
change means the same thing for all cases, regardless of initial levels. It seems unrealistic to assume
that an annual change of 0.05 on a scale of 0-1 means exactly the same, and would be driven by
the same causes for a case that scores only 0.02 versus a case scoring 0.90 (e.g. Saudi Arabia
vs. Denmark in 2019), or for that matter a case near the regime cutoff, where it may signal the
difference between autocracy and democracy. Finally, the incrementalist approach typically assumes
symmetric effects and models negative and positive changes simultaneously, while we have no specific
theories suggesting whether the drivers should be expected to be the same (Teorell, 2010).
Second, the quantitative literature from both approaches amplifies short-term changes. Whether
measured as a dichotomy or interval, regime change is typically treated as an annual event. Regress-
ing the probability of regime change (whether dichotomous or incremental) on antecedent factors
without considering the gradual changes that preceded it risks misattributing causes by interpreting
the effects of a long-term process through short-term changes in correlated independent variables.
This contrasts with the longer, gradual, and highly uncertain processes of regime transformation
described in the case-based literature (e.g. Rustow, 1970; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003).
Third, existing approaches require scholars to choose between either treating democratization
and autocratization as separate fields of inquiry or as meaningful equivalents. For example, while
Huntington (1993) analyzes waves and reverse waves within a unified framework, his ultimate area
of inquiry rests on democratic transitions. Whereas Linz (1978) discusses the breakdown of demo-
cratic regimes, Linz and Stepan (1996) focus exclusively on democratic transitions (and consolida-
tion), with little bridging between the theories. This trend carries over into quantitative research
that typically theorizes and models democratic transition and democratic breakdown in separate
publications. By contrast, the incrementalist approach usually provides no distinction between
democratization and autocratization. Incremental annual changes on democracy scores – whether
the outcome or the predictor – implicitly assume that all unit changes are empirical equivalents,
regardless of whether those changes are positive or negative. Few studies assess whether factors
associated with positive changes are distinct from those associated with negative ones (Bernhard
and Edgell, 2019; Teorell, 2010). As a result, the literature presents parallel sets of explanations for
related processes, with a proliferation of jargon (e.g., “democratic backsliding” versus “autocratiza-
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tion”) and incomplete theory building. We know very little about whether, and how transitions in
either direction are similar (or complements) over time, both in process and their determinants.
We submit a unified framework with accompanying dataset making it possible to avoid these
three limitations.
The episodes of regime transformation (ERT) framework
In essence, the transitologist approach treats regimes taxonomically by dichotomizing them and
the incrementalist approach treats regimes as a single class of phenomenon whose attributes can be
quantified along a unidimensional continuum4, akin to differences in kind vs. degree (Sartori, 1970).
While presently distinct in the literature, they are compatible. Long ago Sartori (1970: 1039) noted,
“... the logic of either-or cannot be replaced with the logic of more-and-less. Actually the two logics
are complementary, and each has a legitimate field of application.” (emphasis added). With the
ERT, we offer a unifying framework that bridges the complementary transitologist and incremen-
talist perspectives and leverages the strengths of each, to overcome some of the present challenges
in the field of regime change studies. We conceptualize episodes of regime transformation as periods
when a country undergoes sustained and substantial changes along a democracy-autocracy contin-
uum.5 These episodes substantively transform the regime (fitting with the incrementalist approach)
but may not necessarily yield a regime transition (from the transitologist approach).6 Thus, we ap-
ply a “directional” definition to regime transformation whereby democratization and autocratization
occur even if the case does not cross some qualitative threshold of democracy (Treisman, 2020: p.6).
As illustrated in Figure 1, we begin by broadly distinguishing episodes based on their direction of
movement along a continuum from liberal democracy to closed autocracy (Schedler, 2001). We treat
regimes as the same class of phenomena that can exhibit varying degrees of conformity to liberal
democracy as an ideal type (similar to the incrementalist approach), while also acknowledging the
important dividing line between regimes that fulfill the minimal criteria for democracy and those
4This is possible because at its very core autocracy is considered to be a “residual category” (Svolik, 2012) defined
by “what it is not” (Linz, 1975), namely not democracy.
5Such an approach was first suggested by Lührmann and Lindberg (2019) for episodes of autocratization.
6Here we refer to regime transition as any transition from autocracy to democracy or from democracy to autocracy.
While we also consider changes between closed and electoral autocracy (for democratization episodes) and liberal and
electoral democracy (for autocratization episodes) as outcomes of regime transformation, we do not refer to these as
regime transitions.
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that do not (similar to the transitologist approach). We base these minimal criteria on the six
institutional guarantees for participation and contestation set forth by Dahl (1971). The upper
part of Figure 1 illustrates democratization as an overarching concept for episodes that exhibit
substantial and sustained improvement of democratic institutions and practices (Wilson et al.,
2020). Conversely, the lower part of Figure 1 depicts autocratization as episodes that result in a
sustained and substantial decline of democratic attributes (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). Thus,
we consider autocratization and democratization as obverse regime transformation processes.
We further distinguish episodes that have the potential to produce a regime transition from
those that enrich qualities congruent with the current regime type.7 The former, represented by the
dashed lines in Figure 1, include episodes of democratization in autocracies (liberalizing autocracy)
and episodes of autocratization in democracies (democratic regression). The latter, represented by
the solid lines in Figure 1, include episodes of democratization in democracies (democratic deepening)
and episodes of autocratization in autocracies (autocratic regression).
Closed autocracy Electoral autocracy Electoral democracy Liberal democracy
Democratization
Liberalizing autocracy Democratic deepening
Autocratic regression Democratic regression
Autocratization
Figure 1. Conceptualizing episodes of regime transformation
Regime transformation processes are highly uncertain and a transition is neither inevitable nor
the only possible outcome (Schedler, 2001, 2013; Treisman, 2020). Figure 2 depicts possible outcomes
of ERTs. The dotted line illustrates the boundary between democracy (above) and autocracy
(below). Panel (a) provides an overview of outcomes for democratization episodes. A democratic
transition occurs when an autocratic regime sees sufficient reforms to cross a minimal threshold of
democracy and then holds a founding democratic election. We define a democratic founding election
as the first free and fair election held under minimally democratic conditions after which the elected
officials assumed or continued office in either the national legislature, executive, or constituent
assembly. Liberalizing autocracies can fail to produce a democratic transition in three ways. First,
7In Figure 1, transitions to democracy and democratic breakdowns are represented by the space between electoral
autocracy and electoral democracy but are included under the dashed line because they have the potential to reverse.
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the regime could encounter a preempted democratic transition by achieving minimally democratic
conditions but failing to hold a founding election before reverting back to autocracy. Second,
autocratic regimes may undergo substantial liberalization before becoming a stabilized electoral
autocracy. Third, after experiencing substantial liberalization, the regime could revert back to lower
levels of democracy (i.e. reverted liberalization, Wilson et al., 2020). Finally, for existing democracies
that experience an ERT (i.e. democratic deepening), we consider the outcome a foregone conclusion



















Figure 2. Outcomes of democratization (a) and autocratization (b) episodes.
Panel (b) of Figure 2 illustrates outcomes in autocratization episodes, which mirror Panel (a).
A democratic breakdown occurs when a democratic regime regresses to below the minimal threshold
of democracy and one of the following conditions holds (a) it is considered to be a closed autocracy
(i.e. no longer holds multiparty elections for the executive or the legislature); (b) holds a found-
ing authoritarian election for the executive, legislature, or a constituent assembly; or (c) remains
autocratic for a sufficient period of time to no longer be considered a democracy. Episodes of demo-
cratic regression may avoid breakdown in three ways. First, a preempted democratic breakdown
occurs when a democracy falls below the minimal threshold for democracy but then crosses back
above the threshold meeting any of the additional criteria sufficient for breakdown listed above.
Second, a regime can decline in democratic quality before stabilizing as a diminished democracy.
8Admittedly this is one area where more theorizing is yet to be done.
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Third, episodes of democratic regression that see substantial declines in democratic quality before
reverting back to some higher democratic state are classified as averted regression.9 Finally, we also
consider the outcome a foregone conclusion for autocracies experiencing further autocratization (i.e.
autocratic regression), referring to this simply as regressed autocracy.10
Operationalizing ERTs
We operationalize the ERT framework using data collected by the V-Dem project (v10, Coppedge
et al., 2020a). We use the electoral democracy index (EDI) as the continuum from autocracy (0)
to democracy (1). It is based on the perhaps the most widely accepted definition of democracy –
Dahl’s institutional guarantees of polyarchy (Dahl, 1971). The index is constructed from over forty
expert-coded indicators aggregated using a state-of-the-art Bayesian IRT model (Pemstein et al.,
2020; Teorell et al., 2019).
As summarized in Table II, we code ERTs based on substantial and sustained changes on the
EDI, which we operationalize as an initial annual change of at least +/– 0.01 (start inclusion),
followed by an overall change of at least +/– 0.10 over the duration of the episode (cumulative
inclusion). ERTs are considered ongoing as long as the EDI score (i) has an annual change in one
out of every five consecutive years (tolerance), (ii) does not have a reverse annual change of 0.03
or greater (annual turn), and (iii) does not experience a cumulative reverse change of 0.10 over
a five-year period (cumulative turn). The final year of all episodes is coded as the year the case
experienced a change of at least +/– 0.01 after episode onset and immediately prior to experiencing
one of these three conditions for termination. The final year of an ERT (and therefore its duration)
is censored if its end date corresponds with the final year of coding or the year before a gap starts
in the V-Dem coding for the country unit.
Table II. Operationalization of episodes
EDI parameters Democratization Autocratization
Start inclusion 0.01 -0.01
Cumulative inclusion 0.1 -0.1
Annual turn -0.03 0.03
Cumulative turn -0.1 0.1
Tolerance 5 5
9This outcome is similar to “re-equilibriation” (Linz, 1978).
10As above, more work could possibly be done to theorize about other potential outcomes here.
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We then determine the outcome of each episode in accordance with Figure 2. We use the Regimes
of the World categorization (Lührmann et al., 2018) and information about the timing of elections
from V-Dem to identify regime changes such as democratic transitions and breakdowns. Other
outcomes are based on criteria for determining episode termination. The outcome is censored for
episodes that have the potential for a regime change but are ongoing in the final observation year
of the dataset or before a gap in coding. Further details on the operationalizaton of ERT outcomes
can be found in the codebook (Edgell et al., 2020).
Many of the thresholds set here may seem somewhat arbitrary. We have intentionally combined
these cutoffs on a continuous scale with additional qualitative criteria guided by existing theories
about democratization and autocratization. We began with initial expectations about logical cutoffs
and conducted comprehensive checks to test the face validity of the operationalization method. As a
result of these tests, and due to a desire to harmonize the data across episodes and minimize overlap
between autocratization and democratization, the cutoffs for annual turn and tolerance have been
adjusted from our initial values based on an inductive process.11 For additional transparency and
accessibility, we provide an R package (Maerz et al., 2020) that replicates the ERT based on the
most recent V-Dem dataset.12 The package allows users to engage in robustness and face-validity
tests by setting their own parameters for the cutoffs illustrated in Table II. The ERT dataset builds
on earlier efforts (Wilson et al., 2020; Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019) but includes several important
innovations, which we briefly summarize in the Appendix C.
Overcoming the three core limitations
The unified ERT framework addresses each of the precarious limitations imbued in the bifurcated
literature on regime change. First, the ERT avoids assumptions of unit homogeneity and symmetric
and constant effects. It supports studying gradual processes of regime transformation by drawing
on continuous data while also enabling differentiation of processes and outcomes in a categorical
way, allowing for heterogeneity. By identifying episodes of regime transformation regardless of their
outcome, our approach provides information about “near misses” where a regime transition did not
occur despite considerable potential for it, allowing us to compare “successful” and various types of
11Which were +/– 0.02 and 10 years respectively for democratization and +/– 0.02 and 4 years, respectively for
autocratization.
12The ERT dataset, R package, and codebook are available here: https://github.com/vdeminstitute/ERT
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“unsuccessful” cases. This is especially important, as simply labeling countries as “democratizers”
or “autocratizers” risks overlooking equifinality.
Second, the ERT provides for historically grounded comparisons that allow us to better study
political regime change quantitatively as an inherently uncertain process that is sometimes dramatic
and other times incremental. It recognizes both the transformation process and transition event as
key elements of regime change. While we are not the first to conceptualize regime changes within
“episodes” (see for example, Cassani and Tomini, 2020; Dresden and Howard, 2016; Gurses, 2011;
Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008; Tilly, 2001), past treatments
use the term in the context of creating regime typologies or discrete observations of regime change.
Finally, our approach captures episodes of regime transformation in either direction (both de-
mocratization and autocratization) within one framework. This helps us to unify the literature on
democratic transitions and breakdowns, while also avoiding assumptions about the empirical equiv-
alence of unit changes in opposite directions on the democracy-autocracy continuum. This opens up
opportunities for theory building about whether democratization and autocratization have similar
causes (and effects). In addition, it opens new questions. For example, sequentially obverse episodes
may explain or even be legacies of one another. In sum, establishing replicable rules for identify-
ing democratization and autocratization episodes and summarizing the ways that they begin and
end takes seriously calls for improving research on regime change, both unifying and expanding on
previous works on the topic.
120 years of regime transformation at a glance
Based on these coding rules, the ERT dataset provides information on the start and end year,
type, and outcome of 680 ERTs from 1900 to 2019. Figure 3 provides a summary of these episodes
and their outcomes, following the framework laid out in Figure 1 and 2. We begin by exploring
trends in democratization - by far the more commonly studied pathway of regime transformation
in the literature. Afterward, we turn to the episodes of autocratization, which is a growing area of
inquiry for scholars and of pressing concern for policy-practitioners given the ongoing third wave
of autocratization (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). Thus, our chief contribution is to provide a
comprehensive overview of regime transformation in either direction over the past 120 years, bringing
11
together two complementary but often juxtaposed literatures. The frequency of episode types and



































Outcome censored  (12)
Outcome censored  (12)
Reverted liberalization (123)
Preempted transition (16)
Stabilized electoral autocracy (87)
Democratic transition (33)
Democratic transition and deepening (112)
Deepened democracy (44)
0 50 100 150
Number of Episodes
Figure 3. Description of our sample of episodes of regime transformation (1900-2019)
Episodes of democratization
As shown in the upper half of Figure 3, 63% of the ERT dataset (427 episodes) constitute democrati-
zation. The past 120 years are characterized more by advances of democracy than by setbacks. This
comes as no surprise; since autocracy was the default regime type throughout all of human history
(Ahram and Goode, 2016), regime transformations are more likely to proceed in the democratic di-
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rection. Liberalization in autocracies is far more common (N=383) than deepening in democracies
(N=44), suggesting that reforms occur in autocratic regimes rather than in cases that have already
met the minimal criteria for democracy.
Democratic transition represents the modal outcome for liberalizing autocracies, representing
two out of every five episodes where the outcome is known (or 145 out of 371 uncensored liberaliz-
ing autocracy episodes). A vast majority (77%, 112 episodes) of these episodes go on to experience
further democratic deepening after the transition occurs. Thus, while often considered to be a culmi-
nating event in the literature, democratic transitions more commonly act as waystations embedded
within a longer process of regime transformation. This opens up new opportunities to answer novel
research questions, such as: Why do some countries stop at minimal levels of democracy after
transitioning while others continue with the process of deepening?
Still, democratic transitions are the exception rather than the rule. Over 60% of the time (226
out of 371 uncensored episodes), liberalization does not yield a democracy. This suggests support for
previous findings pointing to democratic emulation as a strategy for survival in autocracies (Levitsky
and Way, 2010; Schedler, 2013; Lust-Okar, 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007), but in fact only 23%
(87 episodes) of uncensored liberalizing autocracy episodes result in a stabilized electoral autocracy.
We find a higher frequency of reverted liberalization (one-third or 123 episodes), in which reforms
– whether strategic or genuine – abruptly reverse course over a one to five year period. Meanwhile,
sixteen other episodes come close to a complete democratic transition, only to be preempted. To
our knowledge, we are the first to demonstrate empirically for a large sample of countries the high
level of uncertainty for liberalization in autocracies that is often discussed by case-based researchers
(e.g. O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Diamond et al., 1989). The ERT also provides the first data
on preempted democratic transitions, as a category of democratic “near misses” that might be useful
for case-based researchers in particular. In large part, these observations have been overlooked due
to limitations of the dominant approaches discussed above, namely an emphasis on transitions as
events or treating incremental changes as equivalents.
Finally, the ERT also provides evidence that the number of ongoing episodes of democratization
are relatively few at present, counting only 20 at the end of 2019 (illustrated by Figure D1 in the
Appendix). This is barely above 4% of all recorded democratization episodes. This reflects the
current world outlook that autocratization is much more common than democratization. Amongst
13
these cases, three – Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, and North Macedonia – achieved a democratic
transition and continued deepening. Six others were already democratic when the episode began,
falling under deepened democracy in Figure 3. The outcome is censored for eleven other ongoing
episodes, as well as for the German Democratic Republic in 1990 due to German reunification.
Episodes of autocratization
As shown in the lower half of Figure 3, 37% of the ERT data (253 episodes) concern autocratization.
A clear majority of these (62%, 157 episodes) occur in already autocratic regimes, resulting in
regressed autocracies. By contrast, only 96 (38%) affect democracies. This demonstrates that
democracies are highly resilient to autocratization onset (cf. Boese et al., 2020), whereas autocracies
are fairly unstable regimes.
The ERT suggests that autocratization is quite fatal for democracies. Amongst the 84 un-
censored episodes of democratic regression, 65 (77%) encounter a democratic breakdown. Put
differently, democracies undergoing autocratization have less than a one-in-four chance of survival.
In addition, once breakdown occurs, further autocratization continues about 79% of the time (51
out of 65 breakdowns). This reinforces the argument made above that regime transitions are often
embedded within a longer process of regime transformation.
While rare, we do observe 19 instances where democracies survived autocratization (i.e. “no
transition” in the lower half of Figure 3). Averted regression is the most common way, occurring
fourteen times (74%). Cases of preempted democratic breakdown are even more infrequent, appear-
ing just five times in the ERT dataset – Mali (1997–1998), India (1971–1976), Georgia (2006–2010),
Finland (1937–1940), and North Macedonia (2000). Qualitative research on this small but diverse
set of episodes may offer new insights into how democracies on the brink of collapse managed to turn
things around. The relative infrequency of averted regression and preempted breakdown suggests
that Linz’ (1978) process of “reequilibriation” is a rare empirical phenomenon.13
Reflecting the present “third wave of autocratization” (e.g. Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019; Ka-
suya and Mori, 2019; Diamond, 2015; Bermeo, 2016; Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018) – we observe 38
countries with an ongoing autocratization episode (more than 15% of the sample) at the end of 2019,
13While we conceptualize diminished democracy as a fourth potential outcome of democratic regression, we do not
observe any cases of this using our empirically derived default parameters.
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hence their duration is censored (see Figure D1).14 Fourteen of these are autocracies falling under
regressed autocracy in Figure 3, such as Egypt since 2013 and Honduras since 2016. Another 13 rep-
resent cases of democratic breakdown followed by further regression - such as Venezuela (since 1999,
breakdown in 2003), Zambia (since 2013, breakdown in 2014), and Turkey (since 2007, breakdown
in 2014). For twelve other democracies, the duration and outcome of autocratization remains cen-
sored - including the United States (since 2015) and India (since 2002), the world’s most populous
democracies. This contrasts with just 20 countries (less than 5%) undergoing democratization.
Comparisons to other datasets
How adequately do dichotomous treatments of democracy and autocracy – which are commonly
used to denote regime change – capture the aforementioned processes of regime transformation?
In Table III, we compare the outcomes observed in the ERT to regime transitions found in Boix
et al. (BMR, 2013) and Cheibub et al. (CGV, 2010), as well as the set of transitions observed when
dichotomizing the continuous Polity IV index at a score of 6 (Marshall et al., 2019). The left column
lists the ERT outcomes and their frequencies. The other columns show the number of democratic
transitions or breakdowns by each of the binary measures that fall within ERTs by outcome.
In general, comparing the outcomes in our sample to discrete transitions indicated by alternative
measures shows evidence of convergent validity – many of the democratic transitions and democratic
breakdowns represented in commonly used binary measures overlap with similar outcomes coded in
the ERT. For democratic transitions, we see the greatest overlap with the BMR measure, accounting
for 62 (43%) out of 145 episodes in the ERT, followed by Polity (57, 39%), and CGV (46, 32%).
Polity shows slightly greater overlap when it comes to democratic breakdown with 30 episodes (46%)
as compared to BMR with 26 episodes (40%). By contrast, CGV only corresponds to 11 (17%)
of democratic breakdowns in our sample. In part, the lower numbers for CGV are the result of
the limited time span covered by this measure (1946–2008). Table D1 in the Appendix reports the
extent of overlap within the temporal domain of each.
At the same time, some discrepancies are striking. For example, transitions based on the Boix
et al. (2013) measure indicate democratization as having occurred in 5 episodes of autocratic re-
14One other autocratization episode in Austria from 1931–1938 is censored by the German invasion and occupation,
which results in a gap in the V-Dem data.
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Table III. Number of episodes that include transitions coded by other datasets
Democratic transition Democratic breakdown
ERT outcomes (N ) BMR CGV Polity BMR CGV Polity
Deepened democracy (44) 2 0 1 0 0 0
Democratic transition (145) 62 46 57 0 0 2
Liberalizing autocracy, no transition (226) 36 35 26 3 4 6
Democratic regression, no transition (19) 0 0 6 0 0 3
Democratic breakdown (65) 1 0 3 26 11 30
Regressed autocracy (157) 5 3 2 35 32 22
Outcome censored (24) 0 0 5 0 0 2
Total (680) 106 84 102 64 47 68
Not counted 28 17 29 20 17 17
BMR=Boix, Miler, Rosato (2012); CGV=Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010);
Polity threshold value=6.
gression, as well as in 36 of our episodes in which liberalization was not followed by a transition.
The differences between dichotomous democracy measures and the ERT support four major take-
aways. First, the extent to which alternative ways of representing regime transition do not overlap
underscores our contribution of a larger sample that covers a longer period of time and counts a
larger number of potential and actual transitions. Second, some of the overlap shows questionable
cases that are misrepresented by binary measures. Third, the differences between binary measures
evidences the potential for measurement error – disagreement between which transitions are reg-
istered by each – affecting quantitative analyses. Fourth, the exercise highlights the importance
of the ERT measuring regime transformations to capture more complex processes (and outcomes)
than can be gleaned from discrete notions of regime change.
Illustrative cases
Face validity is important for determining the value of a new framework. Here, we demonstrate that




Figure 4 illustrates the various ERTs in Turkey over the last century, alongside Polity scores (dotted
line) and regime change events as measured by BMR and CGV. The figure shows that Polity
frequently overstates the level of democracy. The events recorded by BMR and CGV often (but
not always) capture transitions and breakdowns, but only the episodic approach describes Turkey’s
long-term development.
Figure 4. Illustrating the ERT’s face validity for Turkey. Democratization episodes (top) and
autocratization episodes (bottom). Dashed line = Polity.
In 1908, a coalition of reformists called the Young Turks revolted against the authoritarian sul-
tan Abdülhamid II and re-established constitutional rule, but factionalization among its members
resulted in the centralization of authority under a triumvirate of leaders. The Polity score increased
substantially then but remained low, consistent with the observed episode of liberalization in the
ERT that did not result in a transition to democracy (rather, reverted liberalization). Following
the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1938 and World War II, notable reforms occurred such as
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allowing new political parties and trade unions, establishing universal suffrage and direct elections,
and improvements in press freedoms. Based on a threshold value of 6, Polity scores indicate a
democratic transition. However, the Democrat Party that secured a majority of legislative seats in
1950 became increasingly repressive. As a result, the ERT codes this episode as reverted liberaliza-
tion followed by an episode of autocratic regression. Meanwhile, the dichotomous BMR and CGV
measures suggest that nothing happened during this time, which is misleading.
Military officers led a bloodless coup against the party in 1960 and a new constitution was
approved by referendum in 1961, at which point all three measures – and the ERT – suggest
that a democratic transition occurred.15 Likewise, all measures code the military coup in 1980
and the imposition of martial law as a democratic breakdown. A new constitution was approved by
referendum in 1982 and new elections were held in 1983, facilitating another transition to democracy
on which all measures agree.
Democracy in Turkey took a decisive turn after the Justice and Development Party (Adalet
ve Kalkınma Partisi ; AKP) – a conservative populist party with Islamist roots – won a majority
of seats to the legislature in 2002. The Turkish government pursued a democratic reform agenda
to gain EU membership between 2002 and 2005, but reforms stalled and human rights violations
intensified when the EU turned its focus from verbal commitments to the actual implementation of
political reforms (Kubicek, 2011). For many observers, the crackdown against civil society groups,
the media, and peaceful protesters during Istanbul’s Gezi Park protests in 2013 provided a clear
indication that Turkey was regressing (Esen and Gumuscu, 2016; Bashirov and Lancaster, 2018).
Esen and Gumuscu (2016: p. 1590), however, claim that the Freedom and Justice Party (AKP)
began intimidating journalists immediately after its ascent to power in 2002, suggesting an earlier
authoritarian turn. The episodes depicted in Figure 4 suggest that autocratization began in 2007.
Instead of emphasizing democratic breakdown in 2014, our approach treats the events surrounding
the start of the democratic regression episode in the mid-2000s as a critical part of a longer trend.
The case underscores an important difference between an episodic versus a dichotomous approach
to depicting regime change. The different measures of regime change indicate that Turkey transi-
tioned to democracy in 1982, although the process would seem more protracted than is conveyed
15Polity stands alone in coding a 1970 coup as a return to non-democracy. Although military intervention occurred,
it did not result in major political changes.
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by alternative measures. The combination of the episodic approach and V-Dem’s more fine-grained
data used to create the ERT portrays it as more gradual, conflictual, and iterative. The precari-
ousness of democratic development in Turkey after 1982 helps to explain its regression in the late
2000s (Somer, 2017).
Argentina
Figure 5 illustrates major changes in the political development of Argentina, which, like Turkey, also
saw fluctuations in liberalization that did not always represent successful democratization. In 1912,
President Roque Sáenz Peña established universal, secret, and mandatory male suffrage through the
creation of an electoral list. The introduction of free, fair and confidential voting based on universal
adult male suffrage enabled the candidate for the Radical Civic Union (Hipólito Yrigoyen) to win
general elections, ending the party dominance that the oligarchy had once enjoyed (Chen, 2007;
Wynia, 1990). During this time, elections were considered free and fair and courts enjoyed greater
independence (Alston and Gallo, 2010). Notably, this change does not register much in the Polity
data, though both BMR and ERT treat it as a transition to democracy.
Crisis unleashed by the Great Depression led to a coup d’etat in 1930 by Lieutenant General
José Félix Uriburu, which both Polity and Boix et al. (2013) register as democratic breakdown
(Chen, 2007; Wynia, 1990). A political alliance that supported the 1930-coup won the subsequent
general elections; initiating a decade of rule in which conservative groups prevent extremists from
coming to power through fraudulent indirect elections (Alston and Gallo, 2010; Chen, 2007; Wynia,
1990). During this period, the Polity data suggest that the restoration of civilian rule was more
democratic than before the coup, while BMR do not register any regime change.
By the 1940s, the military worried that continued electoral fraud would radicalize Argentine
politics. In 1943, Arturo Rawson replaced President Ramón Castillo in a coup, which invited
subsequent coups. In the presidential election held in 1946, Colonel Juan Perón won as the candidate
of the newly formed Labor Party. Perón was a consummate populist who maintained support
through paternalistic policies and the manipulation of elections, and he was eventually sent into
exile by a military coup in 1956. The datasets disagree on the Peronist period— only CGV codes his
ascension as a democratic transition. The measures also disagree on successor governments. CGV
and BMR code the restoration of civilian government as a democratic transition, while Polity and
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the ERT do not code Argentina as democratizing until after another military intervention in 1962.
Although Perón returned to office in 1973, his death in 1974 and a series of political and economic
crises prompted another coup – this time against his wife and Vice President Isabel Martínez de
Perón – in 1976 (Chen, 2007; Wynia, 1990). The fact that all three measures portray his brief
return as a democratic transition demonstrates a limitation of using discrete events to indicate
democratization. The defeat of Argentina by Great Britain in the Falkland War in 1982 led to a
swift return to civilian rule, which by all measures represented a successful transition to democracy
– the succession of presidents in 1989 marked the first alternation in power between civilians since
1928 (Chen, 2007; Wynia, 1990).
The case of Argentina shows several instances in which various measures disagree. For example,
Boix et al. (2013) seem to concur that Argentina transitioned to democracy in 1912, but this would
be ignored using conventional thresholds for Polity. There are also several instances of liberaliza-
Figure 5. Illustrating the ERT’s face validity for Argentina. Democratization episodes (top) and
autocratization episodes (bottom). Dashed line = Polity.
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tion that did not result in democratization but which dichotomous measures suggest did. Notably,
alternative datasets disagree on whether Perón’s first presidency occurred under democracy. The
episodes shown in Figure 5 differed in important ways. One involved a democratic transition that
did not deepen and another a preempted democratic transition. Moreover, two were characterized
by stabilized electoral autocracy and one by liberalization under autocracy that reverted. These
patterns of regime change – offset by periods of democratic breakdown and autocratic regression –
exemplify the importance of the ERT joining together information on democratization and autoc-
ratization to explain democratic development over time.
The ERT and peace research
The ERT dataset makes several contributions to the study of regime change and will find broad
applications in conflict research. For example, the ERT can inform ongoing debates in the field such
as whether or not autocratizing countries are more or less belligerent (e.g., Ward and Gleditsch,
1998) or whether democratization in ethnically heterogeneous societies leads to a higher risk of civil
conflict (Mousseau, 2001). To illustrate potential applications, we plot in Figure 6 and Figure 7 the
occurrence of inter- and intrastate conflict as recorded in the PRIO/UCDP armed conflict dataset
(Sundberg and Melander, 2013: V20.1), and coup d’états (Powell and Thyne, 2011; Przeworski
et al., 2013) during episodes of liberalizing autocracy (top panel) and democratic regression (bottom
panel).16 Similar plots for deepening democracies and regressing autocracies are in the Appendix
(Figure D2).
Both figures allow for a comparison between episodes that resulted in a regime transition and
those that did not. Figure 6 shows that interstate conflict is more prevalent in episodes without
a transition to democracy. Almost 9% of such episodes experience one or more interstate conflicts
versus only in 4% of episodes that produced a democratic transition. By contrast, we record only a
single international conflict (Indo-Pakistani War of 1971) during episodes of democratic regression,
suggesting that domestic factors drive the erosion and breakdown of democracy. For civil conflicts,
the differences are less pronounced. According to our data, liberalizing autocracies experience
relatively similar rates incidences of intra-state conflict, regardless of whether the ERT produces
16We limit our episodes sample to the post-1945 period so that they overlap with the PRIO/UCDP data.
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a transition to democracy (26% for transitions and 27% for no-transition outcomes). By contrast,
autocratization episodes that produced a democratic breakdown had a much higher incidence of
civil conflict (30% experienced at least one intra-state conflict) than those democracies that avoided
breakdown during autocratization (only 13%). This descriptive finding points to the importance of
domestic conflicts for democratic resilience.
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Figure 6. Conflict and regime transformation. Intrastate conflict (black dots) and interstate con-
flict (orange diamonds) as recorded in the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset (Sundberg and
Melander, 2013) during episodes of liberalizing autocracy (top) and democratic regression (bottom)
by aggregated outcome, 1946–2019. Y-axis shows V-Dem’s electoral democracy index and year zero
represents the pre-episode year.
Figure 7 reveals similar patterns when looking at the occurrence of attempted and successful
coup d’états. Democratization episodes in autocracies that do not result in a democratic transition
are more likely to experience one or more successful coups (13%) or attempted coups (14%) com-
pared to democratic transitions (10% and 9%, respectively). Again, there are larger differences for
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autocratization episodes in democracies. Our data shows that one or more successful coups occurred
in more than one-third of episodes producing a democratic breakdown, while not a single successful
coup is observed during episodes that avoided democratic breakdown. This further reinforces our
knowledge about the the perils of coups (e.g., Derpanopoulos et al., 2016).
Democratic transition No democratic transition
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Figure 7. Coups. Attempted (empty circles) and successful (crossed circles) coup d’états as recorded
by Powell and Thyne (2011) and Przeworski et al. (2013) during episodes of liberalizing autocracy
and democratic regression by aggregated outcome, 1946–2019. Y-axis shows V-Dem’s electoral
democracy index and year zero represents the pre-episode year.
This illustration, while brief, showcases several potential applications of the ERT for peace
research. First, researchers can use episode outcomes as the dependent variable in quantitative
analyses, for example, to analyze the effect of ethnic, religious, or economic conflicts on (failed)
democratic transitions or democratic breakdown. Second, the ERT allows for an adequate sampling
strategy to identify comparable observations, for instance, to explore the role of conflict in deter-
mining what sets apart democratic breakdown from pre-empted breakdowns. The ERT data make
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it easy to identify cases that followed a similar trajectory but arrived at very different outcomes.
Third, the ERT facilitates the study of sequences, processes, and trajectories, shedding new light on
the timing of events – like coups and conflict onset – during periods of regime transformation. Fi-
nally, qualitative researchers may benefit from the ERT in their search for suitable cases for small-n
comparisons. For example, it allows researchers to isolate cases that have similar starting values
for paired comparisons, with conflict as a possible explanation for divergent outcomes of regime
transformation.
Conclusions and reflections
This article presents a framework and accompanying dataset seeking to unify the bifurcated lit-
erature on democratization and autocratization, while also addressing the precarious limitations
imbued in the present literature. The ERT framework eschew assumptions of unit homogeneity
and symmetric and constant effects, and allows analysis of gradual regime transformation processes
while simultaneously categorizing outcomes and identifying equifinality. Second, the ERT facilitate
quantitative analysis of regime change as an inherently uncertain processes that is sometimes dra-
matic and other times incremental. Third, the ERT captures episodes of regime transformation
in either direction (both democratization and autocratization) within a unified framework, while
avoiding assumptions about the empirical equivalence of unit changes in opposite directions on
the democracy-autocracy continuum, or at different ends of the scale.The ERT not only identifies
episodes with a potential for transition, it also includes episodes of “democratic deepening” and
“autocratic regression”. These do not have a prospect for transitions and are often treated as a
separate domain (see, for example, the literature on democratic consolidation). Integrating them
alongside episodes with regime transitions is a valuable point of comparison and represents research
areas that could use and build on the approach outlined here.
Based on the ERT framework and dataset, the article provides several novel empirical conclu-
sions. First, only some ERTs have the potential for a regime transition, and there is no guarantee
that such a transition will occur. Rather, we observe that only about 40% of autocracies that
liberalize become democratic. This contrasts with the 77% fatality rate observed for democracies
once autocratization begins. Second, when a democratic transition or breakdown occurs, in most
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cases the country continues to experience further democratization or autocratization, respectively.
The transition event is one step in a longer process rather than its culmination. Third, democratic
regimes are less prone to experiencing regime transformation, in either direction, when compared
to autocracies. Roughly 80% of the observed episodes of regime transformation since 1900 have
occurred in autocracies. In other words, authoritarian regimes are generally less stable than democ-
racies. Fourth, we have shown that democratization is much more common than autocratization.
This finding fits with the modern expansion of democracy through several global waves of democ-
ratization (Huntington, 1993). Yet, we also reiterate recent evidence showing that the world is
currently undergoing a wave of autocratization – nearly two out of every three countries undergo-
ing regime transformation at the end of 2019 were autocratizing. The fact that we observe many
different outcomes – not just successful democratization – shows considerable room for growth in
studying regime transformation. This is exemplified by the step-wise deterioration of democracies
like present-day Turkey and the bumpy road to democracy experienced by preempted democrati-
zation or reverted liberalization in countries such as Argentina. By embracing an episodes-based
approach, we support a research agenda that encourages bounded generalizations about a complex
and indeterminate phenomenon. Such conclusions may be present in the existing literature, but the
conditions under which certain theories hold are unclear, nor have the explanations for related pro-
cesses been unified. Further developing and exploring a process-oriented approach to identifying and
explaining regime transformation may therefore help to knit together epistemological conclusions
and expand scholarly understanding of an important set of outcomes.
Several promising areas of research await exploration. One area entails looking at the interrela-
tion of past episodes to understand how previous experiences accumulate and affect future outcomes.
Breaking down the assumption that such episodes are independent encourages “sequencing” analyses
of development. Particularly, in the realm of peace research, the ERT allows for a more fine-grained
empirical analysis of how patterns and trajectories of conflicts affect regime transformations and
vice versa. Another important next step is to dig into the processes and evaluate changes within
them, which involves identifying which components of democracy and autocracy changed. One pos-
sibility is that by better conceptualizing episodes of regime transformation and using them to make
empirical comparisons, we might be able to identify cases that are about to transition to democracy
or where democracy might be about to breakdown, which has important policy implications.
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Appendix A Description of democratization episodes
Country Start End Outcome
Afghanistan 2002 2006 Reverted liberalization
Albania 1919 1922 Reverted liberalization
Albania 1946 1947 Reverted liberalization
Albania 1991 1995 Reverted liberalization
Albania 1998 2002 Preempted democratic transition
Algeria 1962 1964 Reverted liberalization
Algeria 1977 1977 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Algeria 1990 1990 Reverted liberalization
Algeria 1995 1998 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Angola 2008 2011 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Argentina 1912 1926 Democratic transition
Argentina 1932 1933 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Argentina 1946 1948 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Argentina 1957 1961 Reverted liberalization
Argentina 1963 1964 Democratic transition
Argentina 1972 1974 Preempted democratic transition
Argentina 1983 1985 Democratic transition
Armenia 1998 2000 Reverted liberalization
Armenia 2010 2019 Outcome censored
Australia 1901 1904 Deepened democracy
Australia 1918 1923 Deepened democracy
Australia 1942 1947 Deepened democracy
Austria 1918 1921 Democratic transition
Azerbaijan 1991 1993 Reverted liberalization
Bahrain 1972 1973 Reverted liberalization
Bahrain 2000 2003 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Bangladesh 1972 1974 Reverted liberalization
Bangladesh 1977 1979 Reverted liberalization
Bangladesh 1984 1997 Democratic transition
Bangladesh 2009 2012 Preempted democratic transition
Barbados 1944 1977 Democratic transition
Belgium 1919 1921 Democratic transition
Belgium 1944 1954 Democratic transition
Belgium 1961 1965 Deepened democracy
Benin 1952 1964 Reverted liberalization
Benin 1990 1997 Democratic transition
Benin 2013 2016 Deepened democracy
Bhutan 2006 2014 Democratic transition
Bolivia 1938 1939 Reverted liberalization
Bolivia 1945 1948 Reverted liberalization
Bolivia 1952 1961 Reverted liberalization
Bolivia 1982 1987 Democratic transition
Bolivia 1990 1994 Deepened democracy
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996 2003 Democratic transition
Botswana 1960 1967 Democratic transition
Brazil 1945 1947 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Brazil 1975 1993 Democratic transition
Bulgaria 1990 1997 Democratic transition
Burkina Faso 1949 1961 Reverted liberalization
Burkina Faso 1978 1979 Reverted liberalization
Burkina Faso 1990 2008 Democratic transition
Burkina Faso 2016 2016 Preempted democratic transition
Burma/Myanmar 1922 1923 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Burma/Myanmar 1945 1953 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Burma/Myanmar 2010 2019 Outcome censored
Burundi 1960 1962 Reverted liberalization
Burundi 1982 1985 Reverted liberalization
Burundi 1992 1993 Reverted liberalization
Burundi 1999 2006 Reverted liberalization
Cambodia 1947 1960 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Cambodia 1990 1994 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Cameroon 1990 1993 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Canada 1920 1938 Democratic transition
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Canada 1942 1954 Deepened democracy
Cape Verde 1972 1975 Reverted liberalization
Cape Verde 1980 1981 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Cape Verde 1990 2000 Democratic transition
Central African Republic 1947 1950 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Central African Republic 1956 1961 Reverted liberalization
Central African Republic 1987 1994 Reverted liberalization
Central African Republic 2005 2010 Reverted liberalization
Central African Republic 2014 2019 Outcome censored
Chad 1945 1957 Reverted liberalization
Chad 1990 1997 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Chile 1932 1937 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Chile 1958 1971 Democratic transition
Chile 1988 1994 Democratic transition
Colombia 1958 1969 Reverted liberalization
Colombia 1972 1975 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Colombia 1982 1995 Democratic transition
Colombia 2007 2015 Deepened democracy
Comoros 1990 1991 Reverted liberalization
Comoros 1997 1997 Reverted liberalization
Comoros 2002 2014 Democratic transition
Costa Rica 1919 1924 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Costa Rica 1950 1962 Democratic transition
Costa Rica 1971 1982 Deepened democracy
Croatia 1992 2004 Democratic transition
Cuba 1901 1904 Reverted liberalization
Cuba 1909 1909 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Cuba 1936 1945 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Cyprus 1960 1961 Preempted democratic transition
Cyprus 1970 1983 Democratic transition
Cyprus 1988 1993 Deepened democracy
Czech Republic 1920 1926 Democratic transition
Czech Republic 1945 1947 Reverted liberalization
Czech Republic 1990 1991 Democratic transition
Democratic Republic of the Congo 1955 1960 Reverted liberalization
Democratic Republic of the Congo 1998 2009 Reverted liberalization
Denmark 1901 1902 Democratic transition
Denmark 1916 1920 Deepened democracy
Denmark 1945 1946 Democratic transition
Dominican Republic 1924 1925 Reverted liberalization
Dominican Republic 1961 1963 Reverted liberalization
Dominican Republic 1966 1970 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Dominican Republic 1978 1988 Democratic transition
Dominican Republic 1995 2013 Democratic transition
Ecuador 1911 1912 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Ecuador 1938 1939 Reverted liberalization
Ecuador 1947 1953 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Ecuador 1967 1969 Reverted liberalization
Ecuador 1978 1984 Democratic transition
Ecuador 2018 2019 Deepened democracy, duration censored
Egypt 1956 1965 Stabilized electoral autocracy
El Salvador 1982 1985 Stabilized electoral autocracy
El Salvador 1991 2000 Democratic transition
El Salvador 2006 2014 Deepened democracy
Equatorial Guinea 1968 1969 Reverted liberalization
Equatorial Guinea 1982 1994 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Eritrea 1940 1942 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Estonia 1919 1922 Democratic transition
Estonia 1993 1993 Democratic transition
Eswatini 1964 1969 Reverted liberalization
Ethiopia 1987 1992 Reverted liberalization
Ethiopia 2015 2019 Outcome censored
Fiji 1963 1977 Democratic transition
Fiji 1992 1997 Democratic transition
Fiji 2002 2002 Democratic transition
Fiji 2010 2019 Outcome censored
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Finland 1917 1925 Democratic transition
Finland 1945 1946 Deepened democracy
Finland 1948 1950 Deepened democracy
France 1945 1949 Democratic transition
France 1966 1980 Deepened democracy
Gabon 1957 1961 Reverted liberalization
Gabon 1987 1994 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Georgia 1993 2005 Democratic transition
Georgia 2011 2015 Deepened democracy
German Democratic Republic 1990 1990 Outcome censored
Germany 1919 1925 Democratic transition
Ghana 1947 1951 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Ghana 1969 1971 Reverted liberalization
Ghana 1979 1980 Preempted democratic transition
Ghana 1993 2001 Democratic transition
Greece 1924 1924 Reverted liberalization
Greece 1927 1930 Reverted liberalization
Greece 1945 1953 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Greece 1974 1976 Democratic transition
Guatemala 1945 1949 Reverted liberalization
Guatemala 1984 2004 Democratic transition
Guatemala 2011 2016 Deepened democracy
Guinea 1957 1958 Reverted liberalization
Guinea 1985 2001 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Guinea 2010 2019 Outcome censored
Guinea-Bissau 1973 1977 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Guinea-Bissau 1990 2002 Reverted liberalization
Guinea-Bissau 2005 2006 Reverted liberalization
Guinea-Bissau 2014 2015 Democratic transition
Guyana 1901 1906 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Guyana 1957 1958 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Guyana 1966 1967 Reverted liberalization
Guyana 1986 2009 Democratic transition
Haiti 1951 1951 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Haiti 1987 1988 Reverted liberalization
Haiti 1991 1991 Reverted liberalization
Haiti 1993 1998 Reverted liberalization
Haiti 2006 2007 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Honduras 1949 1951 Reverted liberalization
Honduras 1971 1971 Reverted liberalization
Honduras 1980 1996 Democratic transition
Hong Kong 1985 1992 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Hungary 1918 1918 Reverted liberalization
Hungary 1920 1925 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Hungary 1988 1995 Democratic transition
Iceland 1904 1909 Democratic transition
Iceland 1916 1917 Deepened democracy
India 1950 1957 Democratic transition
India 1977 2000 Deepened democracy
Indonesia 1945 1956 Preempted democratic transition
Indonesia 1997 2000 Democratic transition
Iran 1906 1910 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Iraq 2004 2011 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Ireland 1921 1924 Democratic transition
Israel 1949 1957 Democratic transition
Israel 1967 1974 Deepened democracy
Italy 1944 1961 Democratic transition
Ivory Coast 1990 1993 Reverted liberalization
Ivory Coast 1995 1996 Reverted liberalization
Ivory Coast 2001 2006 Reverted liberalization
Ivory Coast 2008 2019 Democratic transition, duration censored
Jamaica 1935 1945 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Jamaica 1953 1956 Democratic transition
Jamaica 1984 1998 Democratic transition
Jamaica 2003 2019 Deepened democracy, duration censored
Japan 1945 1964 Democratic transition
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Jordan 1989 1994 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Kenya 1956 1965 Reverted liberalization
Kenya 1990 2003 Reverted liberalization
Kenya 2010 2016 Reverted liberalization
Kosovo 2002 2007 Democratic transition
Kosovo 2013 2015 Deepened democracy
Kosovo 2018 2019 Deepened democracy, duration censored
Kuwait 1961 1966 Reverted liberalization
Kuwait 1981 1981 Reverted liberalization
Kuwait 1991 2005 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Kyrgyzstan 1991 1992 Reverted liberalization
Kyrgyzstan 2003 2012 Reverted liberalization
Laos 1945 1948 Reverted liberalization
Laos 1950 1958 Reverted liberalization
Latvia 1922 1923 Democratic transition
Latvia 1991 1997 Deepened democracy
Lebanon 1942 1944 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Lebanon 1996 2010 Preempted democratic transition
Lesotho 1960 1967 Reverted liberalization
Lesotho 1992 1994 Reverted liberalization
Lesotho 2002 2003 Democratic transition
Liberia 1985 1988 Reverted liberalization
Liberia 1997 1998 Reverted liberalization
Liberia 2005 2007 Democratic transition
Libya 2011 2013 Preempted democratic transition
Lithuania 1920 1922 Democratic transition
Luxembourg 1916 1920 Democratic transition
Luxembourg 1945 1954 Democratic transition
Madagascar 1956 1961 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Madagascar 1985 1994 Democratic transition
Madagascar 2003 2006 Democratic transition
Madagascar 2013 2019 Outcome censored
Malawi 1960 1964 Reverted liberalization
Malawi 1992 1995 Preempted democratic transition
Malawi 2005 2015 Democratic transition
Malaysia 1946 1956 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Malaysia 1972 1975 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Malaysia 1999 2019 Outcome censored
Maldives 1933 1935 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Maldives 2003 2010 Democratic transition
Maldives 2018 2019 Outcome censored
Mali 1946 1961 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Mali 1992 1993 Democratic transition
Mali 2002 2009 Deepened democracy
Mali 2014 2015 Democratic transition
Malta 1921 1921 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Malta 1932 1933 Reverted liberalization
Malta 1945 1951 Democratic transition
Malta 1962 1965 Democratic transition
Mauritania 1945 1947 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Mauritania 1957 1957 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Mauritania 1987 1994 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Mauritania 2007 2007 Reverted liberalization
Mauritania 2010 2010 Reverted liberalization
Mauritius 1948 1949 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Mauritius 1959 1961 Reverted liberalization
Mauritius 1968 1983 Democratic transition
Mexico 1915 1918 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Mexico 1977 2002 Democratic transition
Moldova 1994 1998 Democratic transition
Moldova 2006 2011 Democratic transition
Mongolia 1951 1952 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Mongolia 1990 1998 Democratic transition
Mongolia 2006 2006 Deepened democracy
Montenegro 1999 2004 Democratic transition
Morocco 1963 1964 Reverted liberalization
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Morocco 1993 2005 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Namibia 1989 1991 Preempted democratic transition
Namibia 1995 1995 Democratic transition
Namibia 2003 2016 Deepened democracy
Nepal 1950 1952 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Nepal 1990 1992 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Nepal 2006 2009 Democratic transition
Nepal 2014 2014 Democratic transition
Netherlands 1917 1923 Democratic transition
Netherlands 1945 1949 Democratic transition
Nicaragua 1980 1991 Democratic transition
Niger 1957 1961 Reverted liberalization
Niger 1988 1991 Reverted liberalization
Niger 1993 1994 Democratic transition
Niger 1997 1998 Reverted liberalization
Niger 2000 2002 Democratic transition
Niger 2011 2012 Democratic transition
Nigeria 1976 1980 Reverted liberalization
Nigeria 1998 2000 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Nigeria 2010 2016 Democratic transition
North Macedonia 1993 1999 Democratic transition
North Macedonia 2002 2004 Deepened democracy
North Macedonia 2017 2019 Democratic transition, duration censored
Norway 1906 1918 Democratic transition
Norway 1945 1948 Democratic transition
Oman 2000 2003 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Pakistan 1962 1974 Reverted liberalization
Pakistan 1985 1990 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Pakistan 2002 2015 Reverted liberalization
Palestine/West Bank 1994 2005 Democratic transition
Panama 1904 1905 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Panama 1947 1950 Reverted liberalization
Panama 1953 1956 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Panama 1990 1992 Democratic transition
Papua New Guinea 1960 1977 Democratic transition
Paraguay 1990 1994 Democratic transition
Paraguay 2000 2009 Deepened democracy
Peru 1939 1940 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Peru 1950 1957 Reverted liberalization
Peru 1964 1964 Reverted liberalization
Peru 1976 1982 Democratic transition
Peru 1994 1996 Reverted liberalization
Peru 2001 2004 Democratic transition
Philippines 1944 1948 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Philippines 1982 1990 Democratic transition
Philippines 2007 2015 Democratic transition
Poland 1919 1920 Democratic transition
Poland 1980 1994 Democratic transition
Portugal 1908 1916 Reverted liberalization
Portugal 1970 1984 Democratic transition
Republic of the Congo 1957 1961 Reverted liberalization
Republic of the Congo 1990 1993 Reverted liberalization
Republic of the Congo 2002 2003 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Republic of Vietnam 1955 1957 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Republic of Vietnam 1966 1968 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Romania 1990 1997 Democratic transition
Russia 1987 1992 Democratic transition
Rwanda 1955 1962 Reverted liberalization
Rwanda 1979 1982 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Rwanda 1991 1992 Reverted liberalization
Rwanda 2003 2019 Outcome censored
Sao Tome and Principe 1972 1975 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Sao Tome and Principe 1987 1995 Democratic transition
Senegal 1945 1946 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Senegal 1960 1961 Reverted liberalization
Senegal 1978 1982 Reverted liberalization
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Senegal 1992 1993 Deepened democracy
Serbia 1992 1993 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Serbia 2000 2003 Democratic transition
Seychelles 1963 1970 Reverted liberalization
Seychelles 1979 1985 Reverted liberalization
Seychelles 1991 2004 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Seychelles 2016 2017 Democratic transition
Sierra Leone 1958 1963 Reverted liberalization
Sierra Leone 1994 1997 Reverted liberalization
Sierra Leone 2002 2003 Democratic transition
Sierra Leone 2013 2019 Democratic transition, duration censored
Singapore 1955 1960 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Slovakia 1994 2010 Democratic transition
Slovenia 1990 1998 Democratic transition
Solomon Islands 1960 1982 Democratic transition
Solomon Islands 2002 2004 Preempted democratic transition
Solomon Islands 2007 2011 Democratic transition
Solomon Islands 2015 2019 Deepened democracy, duration censored
Somalia 1950 1966 Reverted liberalization
Somaliland 1993 2014 Reverted liberalization
South Africa 1990 1995 Democratic transition
South Africa 1998 2006 Deepened democracy
South Korea 1945 1949 Stabilized electoral autocracy
South Korea 1964 1964 Stabilized electoral autocracy
South Korea 1976 1998 Democratic transition
South Korea 2015 2019 Deepened democracy, duration censored
Spain 1931 1932 Democratic transition
Spain 1976 1980 Democratic transition
Sri Lanka 1947 1948 Democratic transition
Sri Lanka 1983 1987 Democratic transition
Sri Lanka 1992 1995 Deepened democracy
Sri Lanka 2011 2016 Democratic transition
Sudan 1949 1956 Reverted liberalization
Sudan 1965 1965 Reverted liberalization
Sudan 1986 1987 Reverted liberalization
Sudan 1996 2009 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Suriname 1949 1956 Democratic transition
Suriname 1975 1978 Deepened democracy
Suriname 1987 1990 Preempted democratic transition
Suriname 1992 1992 Democratic transition
Sweden 1917 1929 Democratic transition
Sweden 1971 1974 Deepened democracy
Switzerland 1970 1981 Deepened democracy
Syria 1943 1948 Reverted liberalization
Syria 1953 1955 Reverted liberalization
Syria 1961 1962 Reverted liberalization
Taiwan 1987 2002 Democratic transition
Tanzania 1958 1964 Reverted liberalization
Tanzania 1986 1996 Democratic transition
Thailand 1933 1938 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Thailand 1974 1975 Reverted liberalization
Thailand 1978 1987 Reverted liberalization
Thailand 1992 2001 Democratic transition
Thailand 2008 2008 Reverted liberalization
Thailand 2010 2012 Preempted democratic transition
The Gambia 1946 1948 Stabilized electoral autocracy
The Gambia 1960 1962 Reverted liberalization
The Gambia 1966 1971 Preempted democratic transition
The Gambia 1996 1998 Stabilized electoral autocracy
The Gambia 2014 2019 Outcome censored
Timor-Leste 1998 2008 Democratic transition
Timor-Leste 2012 2019 Deepened democracy, duration censored
Togo 1956 1960 Reverted liberalization
Togo 1991 1999 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Togo 2005 2009 Preempted democratic transition
Togo 2012 2014 Democratic transition
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Trinidad and Tobago 1925 1926 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Trinidad and Tobago 1933 1967 Democratic transition
Trinidad and Tobago 1973 1981 Deepened democracy
Tunisia 1956 1960 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Tunisia 2011 2012 Democratic transition
Turkey 1908 1909 Reverted liberalization
Turkey 1946 1951 Reverted liberalization
Turkey 1962 1967 Democratic transition
Turkey 1983 2006 Democratic transition
Uganda 1953 1963 Reverted liberalization
Uganda 1981 1981 Reverted liberalization
Uganda 1989 1992 Reverted liberalization
Ukraine 1991 1996 Democratic transition
Ukraine 2005 2007 Democratic transition
United Kingdom 1919 1931 Democratic transition
United Kingdom 1945 1952 Deepened democracy
United States of America 1913 1921 Democratic transition
United States of America 1942 1957 Deepened democracy
United States of America 1966 1981 Deepened democracy
Uruguay 1915 1920 Democratic transition
Uruguay 1922 1926 Democratic transition
Uruguay 1936 1949 Democratic transition
Uruguay 1981 1986 Democratic transition
Vanuatu 1970 1984 Democratic transition
Vanuatu 2008 2016 Deepened democracy
Venezuela 1936 1948 Reverted liberalization
Venezuela 1958 1974 Democratic transition
Vietnam 1946 1947 Reverted liberalization
Yemen 1988 1993 Reverted liberalization
Zambia 1961 1964 Reverted liberalization
Zambia 1990 1993 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Zanzibar 1957 1963 Reverted liberalization
Zanzibar 1992 1999 Stabilized electoral autocracy
Zimbabwe 1979 1981 Stabilized electoral autocracy
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Country Start End Outcome
Albania 1937 1940 Regressed autocracy
Algeria 1965 1966 Regressed autocracy
Algeria 1992 1992 Regressed autocracy
Argentina 1930 1931 Democratic breakdown
Argentina 1943 1944 Regressed autocracy
Argentina 1949 1956 Regressed autocracy
Argentina 1960 1962 Regressed autocracy
Argentina 1966 1967 Democratic breakdown
Argentina 1975 1977 Regressed autocracy
Armenia 1992 1997 Democratic breakdown
Armenia 2001 2008 Regressed autocracy
Australia 1907 1917 Averted regression
Austria 1931 1938 Democratic breakdown, duration censored
Azerbaijan 1994 1994 Regressed autocracy
Bahrain 1974 1976 Regressed autocracy
Bahrain 2011 2019 Regressed autocracy, duration censored
Bangladesh 1975 1976 Regressed autocracy
Bangladesh 1982 1983 Regressed autocracy
Bangladesh 2002 2008 Democratic breakdown
Bangladesh 2013 2019 Regressed autocracy, duration censored
Belarus 1995 2006 Democratic breakdown
Belgium 1914 1915 Regressed autocracy
Belgium 1937 1941 Democratic breakdown
Benin 1965 1966 Regressed autocracy
Benin 1970 1973 Regressed autocracy
Benin 2007 2012 Averted regression
Benin 2017 2019 Democratic breakdown, duration censored
Bolivia 1930 1935 Regressed autocracy
Bolivia 1941 1944 Regressed autocracy
Bolivia 1962 1965 Regressed autocracy
Bolivia 1998 2019 Democratic breakdown, duration censored
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010 2015 Averted regression
Brazil 1927 1931 Regressed autocracy
Brazil 1959 1965 Regressed autocracy
Brazil 2012 2019 Uncertain outcome, duration censored
Bulgaria 1923 1935 Regressed autocracy
Bulgaria 2002 2019 Uncertain outcome, duration censored
Burkina Faso 1965 1966 Regressed autocracy
Burkina Faso 1980 1985 Regressed autocracy
Burkina Faso 2014 2015 Democratic breakdown
Burkina Faso 2017 2019 Regressed autocracy, duration censored
Burma/Myanmar 1942 1943 Regressed autocracy
Burma/Myanmar 1958 1963 Regressed autocracy
Burundi 1963 1967 Regressed autocracy
Burundi 1987 1988 Regressed autocracy
Burundi 2008 2019 Regressed autocracy, duration censored
Cambodia 1970 1975 Regressed autocracy
Cambodia 2011 2019 Regressed autocracy, duration censored
Central African Republic 1963 1966 Regressed autocracy
Central African Republic 1999 2004 Regressed autocracy
Chad 1972 1976 Regressed autocracy
Chile 1921 1928 Regressed autocracy
Chile 1973 1974 Democratic breakdown
Chile 2011 2019 Uncertain outcome, duration censored
Colombia 1947 1950 Regressed autocracy
Comoros 1996 1996 Regressed autocracy
Comoros 1999 2000 Regressed autocracy
Comoros 2015 2019 Democratic breakdown, duration censored
Costa Rica 1917 1917 Regressed autocracy
Costa Rica 1946 1948 Regressed autocracy
Croatia 2011 2019 Uncertain outcome, duration censored
Cuba 1906 1907 Regressed autocracy
Cuba 1927 1934 Regressed autocracy
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Cuba 1950 1953 Regressed autocracy
Cuba 1959 1961 Regressed autocracy
Czech Republic 1934 1940 Democratic breakdown
Czech Republic 2009 2019 Uncertain outcome, duration censored
Democratic Republic of the Congo 1961 1966 Regressed autocracy
Democratic Republic of the Congo 2010 2019 Regressed autocracy, duration censored
Denmark 1933 1944 Democratic breakdown
Dominican Republic 1930 1931 Regressed autocracy
Dominican Republic 1964 1964 Regressed autocracy
Dominican Republic 1985 1991 Democratic breakdown
Dominican Republic 2015 2018 Averted regression
Ecuador 1905 1906 Regressed autocracy
Ecuador 1932 1936 Regressed autocracy
Ecuador 1940 1946 Regressed autocracy
Ecuador 1963 1964 Regressed autocracy
Ecuador 1970 1973 Regressed autocracy
Ecuador 2008 2017 Averted regression
Egypt 1952 1953 Regressed autocracy
Egypt 2013 2019 Regressed autocracy, duration censored
Equatorial Guinea 1971 1973 Regressed autocracy
Estonia 1929 1935 Democratic breakdown
Estonia 1991 1992 Democratic breakdown
Eswatini 1970 1974 Regressed autocracy
Fiji 1987 1988 Democratic breakdown
Fiji 2000 2001 Democratic breakdown
Fiji 2006 2007 Democratic breakdown
Finland 1937 1940 Preempted democratic breakdown
France 1934 1941 Democratic breakdown
France 1964 1965 Averted regression
Georgia 2006 2010 Preempted democratic breakdown
Germany 1921 1939 Democratic breakdown
Ghana 1962 1966 Regressed autocracy
Ghana 1972 1973 Regressed autocracy
Ghana 1981 1982 Regressed autocracy
Greece 1915 1923 Regressed autocracy
Greece 1933 1937 Regressed autocracy
Greece 1966 1968 Regressed autocracy
Guatemala 1953 1956 Regressed autocracy
Guinea 2002 2009 Regressed autocracy
Guinea-Bissau 2010 2013 Regressed autocracy
Guyana 1969 1981 Regressed autocracy
Haiti 1992 1992 Regressed autocracy
Haiti 2000 2005 Regressed autocracy
Honduras 1955 1955 Regressed autocracy
Honduras 1972 1973 Regressed autocracy
Honduras 1998 2011 Democratic breakdown
Honduras 2016 2019 Regressed autocracy, duration censored
Hungary 1919 1919 Regressed autocracy
Hungary 1926 1945 Regressed autocracy
Hungary 1948 1950 Regressed autocracy
Hungary 2010 2019 Democratic breakdown, duration censored
India 1971 1976 Preempted democratic breakdown
India 2002 2019 Uncertain outcome, duration censored
Indonesia 1957 1961 Regressed autocracy
Iran 1953 1954 Regressed autocracy
Iraq 1957 1969 Regressed autocracy
Iraq 2009 2019 Regressed autocracy, duration censored
Israel 2010 2019 Uncertain outcome, duration censored
Italy 1916 1929 Regressed autocracy
Ivory Coast 2000 2000 Regressed autocracy
Kosovo 2016 2017 Averted regression
Kuwait 1975 1976 Regressed autocracy
Kuwait 1986 1986 Regressed autocracy
Kyrgyzstan 1993 2002 Regressed autocracy
Laos 1959 1965 Regressed autocracy
Laos 1973 1976 Regressed autocracy
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Latvia 1929 1939 Democratic breakdown, duration censored
Lesotho 1969 1971 Regressed autocracy
Lesotho 1995 1995 Regressed autocracy
Lesotho 2015 2017 Averted regression
Liberia 1980 1981 Regressed autocracy
Liberia 1989 1996 Regressed autocracy
Liberia 1999 2004 Regressed autocracy
Libya 2014 2019 Regressed autocracy, duration censored
Lithuania 1924 1927 Democratic breakdown
Luxembourg 1940 1941 Democratic breakdown
Madagascar 1972 1973 Regressed autocracy
Madagascar 1996 2002 Democratic breakdown
Madagascar 2009 2010 Democratic breakdown
Malawi 1996 2000 Regressed autocracy
Malaysia 1964 1970 Regressed autocracy
Maldives 2011 2017 Democratic breakdown
Mali 1964 1969 Regressed autocracy
Mali 1997 1998 Preempted democratic breakdown
Mali 2011 2012 Democratic breakdown
Malta 1930 1931 Regressed autocracy
Malta 1934 1934 Regressed autocracy
Malta 1954 1959 Democratic breakdown
Mauritania 1978 1979 Regressed autocracy
Mauritius 1962 1962 Regressed autocracy
Moldova 2000 2005 Democratic breakdown
Moldova 2012 2018 Averted regression
Namibia 1992 1994 Regressed autocracy
Nepal 1960 1961 Regressed autocracy
Nepal 2000 2003 Regressed autocracy
Nepal 2012 2013 Democratic breakdown
Netherlands 1933 1941 Democratic breakdown
Nicaragua 1992 1999 Averted regression
Nicaragua 2003 2019 Democratic breakdown, duration censored
Niger 1962 1975 Regressed autocracy
Niger 1995 1996 Democratic breakdown
Niger 1999 1999 Regressed autocracy
Niger 2007 2010 Democratic breakdown
Niger 2013 2019 Uncertain outcome, duration censored
Nigeria 1983 1984 Regressed autocracy
North Macedonia 2000 2000 Preempted democratic breakdown
North Macedonia 2007 2013 Democratic breakdown
Norway 1937 1943 Democratic breakdown
Pakistan 1978 1979 Regressed autocracy
Pakistan 1999 2000 Regressed autocracy
Pakistan 2016 2019 Regressed autocracy, duration censored
Palestine/West Bank 2007 2013 Democratic breakdown
Panama 1941 1946 Regressed autocracy
Panama 1964 1969 Regressed autocracy
Papua New Guinea 2002 2018 Democratic breakdown
Peru 1948 1949 Regressed autocracy
Peru 1968 1973 Regressed autocracy
Peru 1985 1992 Democratic breakdown
Philippines 1941 1942 Regressed autocracy
Philippines 1969 1973 Regressed autocracy
Philippines 2001 2005 Democratic breakdown
Philippines 2016 2019 Democratic breakdown, duration censored
Poland 1926 1931 Democratic breakdown
Poland 2013 2019 Uncertain outcome, duration censored
Portugal 1926 1927 Regressed autocracy
Republic of the Congo 1962 1969 Regressed autocracy
Republic of the Congo 1994 1998 Regressed autocracy
Republic of Vietnam 1960 1964 Regressed autocracy
Romania 1938 1940 Regressed autocracy
Russia 2000 2004 Regressed autocracy
Rwanda 1973 1974 Regressed autocracy
Rwanda 1993 1995 Regressed autocracy
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Senegal 1963 1963 Regressed autocracy
Serbia 2009 2019 Democratic breakdown, duration censored
Seychelles 1977 1978 Regressed autocracy
Sierra Leone 1965 1968 Regressed autocracy
Sierra Leone 2007 2014 Democratic breakdown
Solomon Islands 2000 2001 Democratic breakdown
Somalia 1965 1970 Regressed autocracy
South Africa 2009 2019 Uncertain outcome, duration censored
South Korea 1962 1962 Regressed autocracy
South Korea 1971 1973 Regressed autocracy
South Korea 2008 2016 Averted regression
Spain 1922 1924 Regressed autocracy
Spain 1936 1940 Democratic breakdown
Sri Lanka 1970 1982 Democratic breakdown
Sri Lanka 1998 2009 Democratic breakdown
Sudan 1957 1960 Regressed autocracy
Sudan 1969 1970 Regressed autocracy
Sudan 1989 1990 Regressed autocracy
Suriname 1980 1982 Democratic breakdown
Suriname 1991 1991 Regressed autocracy
Syria 1949 1952 Regressed autocracy
Syria 1958 1960 Regressed autocracy
Syria 1963 1966 Regressed autocracy
Tajikistan 1992 1995 Regressed autocracy
Tanzania 1965 1967 Regressed autocracy
Tanzania 2000 2005 Democratic breakdown
Tanzania 2015 2019 Uncertain outcome, duration censored
Thailand 1976 1977 Regressed autocracy
Thailand 1991 1991 Regressed autocracy
Thailand 2005 2007 Democratic breakdown
Thailand 2013 2019 Regressed autocracy, duration censored
The Gambia 1993 1995 Regressed autocracy
Togo 1963 1963 Regressed autocracy
Togo 1967 1967 Regressed autocracy
Togo 2010 2011 Regressed autocracy
Togo 2017 2019 Democratic breakdown, duration censored
Trinidad and Tobago 1969 1972 Averted regression
Turkey 1956 1961 Regressed autocracy
Turkey 1980 1981 Democratic breakdown
Turkey 2007 2019 Democratic breakdown, duration censored
Uganda 1966 1972 Regressed autocracy
Uganda 1985 1986 Regressed autocracy
Ukraine 1997 2004 Democratic breakdown
Ukraine 2008 2017 Democratic breakdown
United States of America 2015 2019 Uncertain outcome, duration censored
Uruguay 1921 1921 Democratic breakdown
Uruguay 1931 1934 Democratic breakdown
Uruguay 1959 1976 Democratic breakdown
Vanuatu 1988 1992 Averted regression
Venezuela 1949 1949 Regressed autocracy
Venezuela 1992 1992 Averted regression
Venezuela 1999 2019 Democratic breakdown, duration censored
Yemen 2008 2019 Regressed autocracy, duration censored
Zambia 1965 1974 Regressed autocracy
Zambia 2013 2019 Democratic breakdown, duration censored
Zanzibar 1964 1964 Regressed autocracy
Zanzibar 2013 2019 Regressed autocracy, duration censored
Zimbabwe 1978 1978 Regressed autocracy
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Appendix C The ERT dataset vs earlier operationalizations
The ERT dataset builds on earlier efforts of measuring democratization and autocratization episodes
(Wilson et al., 2020; Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019) but includes several important innovations:
First, because many countries operate on a five-year election cycle (Inter-Parliamentary Union,
2020), we adjust the time-tolerance parameter to five years, allowing countries to hold an elec-
tion during the episode interval. Second, we increase the annual turn threshold from 0.02 to 0.03,
because face-validity checks show that it is not uncommon that episodes experience a single-year
annual turn of 0.02 followed by continued sustained declines (autocratization) or improvements (de-
mocratization). The lower threshold used by previous works thus has the consequence of sometimes
artificially cutting apart episodes in separate pieces, which our change reconciles. Finally, we intro-
duce a cumulative turn parameter as an additional termination criteria based on gradual changes
of 0.10 for the measurement of autocratization episodes (cf. Wilson et al., 2020).
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Figure D1. Description of episodes in the sample with duration censored.
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Table D1. Proportion of episodes that include transitions coded by other datasets
(Note: based on the number of episodes in the same time span)
Democratic transition Democratic breakdown
ERT outcomes (N ) BMR CGV Polity BMR CGV Polity
Deepened democracy 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
Democratic transition 0.49 0.53 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.01
Liberalizing autocracy, no transition 0.17 0.21 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.03
Democratic regression, no transition 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.16
Democratic breakdown 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.59 0.46 0.56
Regressed autocracy 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.25 0.29 0.15
Outcome censored 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.11
BMR=Boix, Miler, Rosato (2012); CGV=Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010);
Polity threshold value=6.
Deepened democracy





































































Figure D2. Coups and conflict. Intrastate conflict (filled circles) and interstate conflict (orange dia-
monds) and Attempted (empty circles) and successful (crossed circles) coup d’états during episodes
of deepened democracy and regressed autocracy, 1946–2019. Y-axis shows V-Dem’s electoral democ-
racy index and year zero represents the pre-episode year.
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